ABSTRACT In cognitive radio networks, an adversary transmits signals with characteristics that emulate those of primary users to prevent secondary users from transmitting. Such an attack is called a primary user emulation (PUE) attack. In this paper, a game theoretical framework is proposed to study the primary user emulation attack (PUEA) on cognitive radio nodes as a game of imperfect information between the secondary users (SUs), who do not exchange game information between them against the adversaries generating the PUEA and to define optimal strategies with minor computational demands. When the SU challenges the PU emulator successfully, updating the information on a cloud-based database enables the rest of the network to know the identity of PUE. As the game evolves, the grand coalition of the secondary users acts as the one without collaboration against the PU emulator playing a winning strategy. The performance of the game for optimal strategies is equal to the performance of the collaborative methods for PUEA detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio technology was introduced to answer the spectrum scarcity problem by enabling an unused or underutilized spectrum to be used by users who are not licensed (secondary users-SUs) whenever the licensed users (primary users-PUs) vacate the spectrum. Although the SUs must periodically sense the spectrum, find the best spectrum band, dynamically access the spectrum -Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) and vacate it within a certain time upon the return of the primary user, the sensing mechanisms for PU detection do not guarantee a 100% accuracy. This vulnerability makes the cognitive network prone to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, namely, Primary User Emulation Attacks (PUEAs). The selfish PUEA behavior is studied, i.e., when the adversaries do not act maliciously but want to gain the spectrum selfishly.
Actually, the scheme that describes the coexistence with the primary network fall into three classes: Underlay, Overlay and Interweave. In the underlay approach, simultaneous secondary and primary transmissions are allowed as long as the interference level at the primary user side remains acceptable. In the overlay approach, primary users share knowledge of their signal codebooks and messages with the cognitive users. Finally in the interweave approach, cognitive users sense the spectrum in different dimensions to find the abundant spectrum gaps. Hybrid schemes using a combination of the aforementioned approaches improve the efficiency of spectrum sharing and maximize the transmission rate once a spectrum opportunity is detected.
Due to the nature of dynamic spectrum access, the CR network became vulnerable to attacks by hostile users regarding all theits main functionalities such as spectrum sensing, spectrum mobility, spectrum sharing and spectrum management. The typical attacks on CR networks may include Primary User Emulation Attacks, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, system penetration, repudiation, spoofing, authorization violation, malware infection, and data modification. These attacks cause potential threats to the information confidentiality, integrity and availability of the CR network. The Primary User Emulation Attack is considered here.
This paper introduces a method beginning from an original imperfect game of non-partial observations of the players without collaboration/cooperation that eventually evolves to a perfect game with coordination between the players such that they make the same decisions without exchanging messages and then apply the formation to PUEA Detection problem. The PUEs will have a serious penalty for PU Emulation, if detected by the PU. The grand coalition of the SUs achieves coordination as the game evolves and acts as one SU playerwithout collaboration -who plays a zero-sum game with the PUE. It is considered one arrival of PUE each time. Perfect recall is also considered, i.e., the nodes are aware of all of their past actions and observations. The optimal strategy of the zero-sum game is calculated, and the value of the game is also calculated. Upon successful detection of a PUE a Cloudbased database is updated such that the rest of the network knows the identity of the attacker. The SU nodes connect to the Cloud-based database periodically.
The real PUE transmission probability is eliminated over the range of 0.5% to 1.3% for the PUE optimal strategy, the per SU basis high values up to 99%, while the PUE detection negative reaches 6%. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections I and II are an introduction to the work reported in this paper and related work on PUE Attack, respectively. Section III is a thorough description of the system model, particularly subsection A, which is a presentation of Information Tracking in Games. Subsection B is a presentation of Epistemic Unfolding with Knowledge Sets and subsection C introduces the new game of imperfect information, which evolves, while playing, to a game of perfect information based on Information Tracking and Epistemic Unfolding with Knowledge Sets. The new game is applied to the PUE problem, which is solved, and optimal strategies are computed. The results for optimal strategies are similar to the collaborative method results for PUE Detection.
II. RELATED WORK
In [1] , the authors study imperfect games and introduce the constraints for a safety game based only on the observations of the players, but they do not define best strategies. Best strategies and perfect coordination construction are introduced in [2] for imperfect games of players with partial observations -the observations of the game by the SUs are not partial. This limitation is overcome by combining both [1] and [2] , extending them such that a new type of game is introduced that is not dependent on the states of the game but on the knowledge sets (knowledge gained) states that are extracted by the analysis of the game according to [1] and then by applying the Deterministic Finite Automaton of Knowledge states to play a winning strategy.
Most studies on PUE Detection are location-based and use collaboration among the SU nodes. In [3] , the authors compare the transmission origin with the previous known-PU position, and we identify similar approaches in [4] , [5] . A coordinated decision is reached in [6] and in [7] and [8] the position of the PUE is estimated. In [9] , the authors use the phase noise of a local oscillator as a fingerprint to differentiate the incumbent signals from the attacking ones. Exploiting the collaboration between the nodes and the detection results reaches 99%. In [10] , the signal activity pattern of the PU is used to detect a Primary User Emulation Attack. Coordination between one-hop nodes is used for PUE Detection in COOPON that reaches 87% for successful detection [11] . In [12] , a two-level database-assisted detection approach is proposed to detect PUE attacks. Collaboration is the parameter that contributes more in detection [9] .
In [13] , the PUE Detection is formulated as a game, and a belief factor is introduced to learn the state of the primary user that is compared to a Bayesian belief estimation. The former achieves PU detection approximately 95.55%-95.29%, and the latter achieves PU detection approximately 83.57%-82.21%. The belief factor is updated with the information gathered by policy nodes, i.e., not real-time. The game theory is used to detect the selfish attacks [14] in the system. Chan et al. [15] describe the payoff problems between the users. In [16] , the authors present a constant sum differential game approach to mitigate the PUE attack. Based on the assumption that the PUE attacker has less energy than the PUs, they look for the optimal sensing strategy of SU. The Nash equilibrium solution is obtained. The authors in [17] formulate a non-zero-sum game with incomplete information for selfish and malicious PUE attacks without coordination to be achieved between the SU players at some point with no schedule for network parameter update while playing. In [18] , they neither use collaboration nor past-PUE log information, and they achieve probability detection and false alarm probabilities equal to 90% and 10%, respectively. A Cloud service for strong centralized trust management is introduced in [19] .
This paper proposes a model for achieving coordination without collaboration in imperfect game systems with non-partial observations, something that holds for Cognitive Radio Network. This model is introduced in this paper and is later applied in the well-known PUE Attack Detection problem in a non-cooperative Cognitive Radio Network. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to introduce coordination without collaboration between SUs in a CRN for handling PUEA. The system has high performance. The secondary nodes must follow the same strategy based on the well-known penalties and gains that depend on the network conditions and are retrieved periodically from the Cloud database.
III. SYSTEM MODEL A. DISTRIBUTED GAMES AND INFORMATION TRACKING
In [1] , the authors address the fundamental problem in distributed systems of decomposing a global winning strategy such that the individual agents operate on the information they can access. The information tracking on game graphs of games with imperfect information and particularly the unwrapping of the information sets K i in a graph game with finite tracking is presented. The authors decide on a deterministic finite automaton construction of information sets that satisfies winning conditions on a game graph, and they add a choice function s i (K ), thus implementing a distributed winning strategy. The analysis does not include optimal strategies.
A game with perfect information is a game where a player knows the state of the play at any stage. If the player does not, we speak of a game with imperfect information. Imperfect information arises naturally in computational models as an effect of locality of components, internal variables, privacy constraints, or incomplete specifications. One highly nontrivial issue regarding uncertainty in computational systems is whether the different players have the means to synchronize their moves. The general approach of solving games with imperfect information in the synchronous setting is the power-set construction proposed in for solving games for one player against nature [1] .
B. PERFECT COORDINATION IN IMPERFECT GAMES
In [2] , the authors transform an n-player game G with imperfect information into a two-player zero-sum game G + with perfect information and define the best strategies such that the grand coalition in G has a winning strategy against nature if, and only if, the first player has a winning strategy in G+; winning strategies of the first player in G+ can be translated uniformly into joint winning strategies of the grand coalition in G and vice versa. To describe the knowledge acquired by the players during a play, they use epistemic models. An epistemic model over G is a Kripke structure
is a transition of K, and each ∼ i is an equivalence relation on K such that, for all k, k ∈ K, if k ∼ ik, then υk ∼ iυk, with υ k denoting the unique element from V such that k ∈ Pυk.
C. EPISTEMIC UNFOLDING WITH KNOWLEDGE SETS
This paper proposes a system for solving an imperfect game G in which players initially may pass through states of perfect information. The epistemic unfolding [2] is extended, and best strategies are defined. There are two phases for reaching the solution. In the first phase, the initial game graph G is unraveled, and the tracking of G is extracted to identify, if possible, and compute the Knowledge Sets and a finite-state automaton and, consequently, the distributed winning strategy. In the second phase, we compute the Kripke structures of the Knowledge Sets, and we perform epistemic unfolding in the new game in which the states are the Knowledge Sets of the G. We transform the game then to an equivalent one and inquire whether it is possible for the grand coalition to play a game of perfect information where all players play a winning strategy and act as one, i.e., they are coordinated without cooperation, i.e., message exchange.
It is necessary to provide some definitions for the imperfect information games, as well as several theorems and lemmas that have been considered as preliminaries for the epistemic unfolding with knowledge set solving of a game with imperfect information.
We consider a game of n players against nature. We consider a set A i of actions available to player i and a set of observations B i for player i.A is the set of action profiles and B the set of observation profiles. Next, a game graph is a structure G = ( , , (βi)i < n with V the set of positions, the move relationship ⊆ ×A × and an observation function β i : −→ B i for each player i < n. G is a game tree if , is a tree. A play π starting from initial position υ 0 ∈ in G is an infinite sequence of actions and positions π = υ 0 , α 0 , υ 1 , υ 1 , . . . where (υ l , α, υ l+1 ) ∈ , for all l ≥ 0. We can extend observations to β i (π) = β i (υ 0 ) , β i (υ 1 ) , . . . Thus, a strategy for a player i is a function s i :
A winning condition over a game graph Gis a set W ⊆ ( A) ω of plays. A game G consists of its game graph and a winning condition. A play π is winning if π ⊆ W . A strategy s I is a winning strategy if all outcomes are winning. A coloring function (G, , (β i ) i<n , γ ) is available for games such that we can say that a coloring is observable by player i if β i (υ) = β i υ . Then, the coloring holds that γ (υ) = γ υ . A safety game is a game with two colors observable to all players γ : −→ {safe, notsafe} such that W = {safe ω , i.e., a play π is winning if it avoids all ''notsafe'' colored positions. A bisimulation between two game graphs G and G is a binary relation Z ⊆ × that preserves the colors and the observations. If two game trees T and T are bisimilar, then the games (T, W ) and (T , W )are equivalent for every winning condition W . The unravelling of a game graph G from a position υ 0 is a game tree T(G, υ 0 ) where the set of positions consists of all initial plays G, υ 0 , the move relationship consists of edges π, α, π for all plays π = υ 0 , α 0 , . . . , υ l and π = υ 0 , α 0 , . . . , υ l , α l , υ l+1 with α l = α, the observation function of Player i maps every play υ 0 , α 0 , . . . , υ l to β i (υ l ), and the coloring function maps every υ 0 , α 0 , . . . , υ l to γ i (υ l ). Therefore, the projection T (G, υ 0 ) −→ G, υ 0 sending every initial play to its last position defines a bisimulation between T (G, υ 0 ) and G, υ 0 . Extending this projection to entire plays allows us to view any winning condition W over a game graph as a winning condition over its unravelling and speak of (T (G, υ 0 ) , W ) as the unravelling of the game (G, υ 0 , W ) [1] .
The indistinguishability relation of Player i on game tree
The indistinguishability relation of Player i on game graph G, υ 0 is his indistinguishability relation on the unravelling of G, υ 0 [1] . The indistinguishability relation on a game tree T satisfies perfect recall. The extensive form Ext(G, υ 0 ) of a game graph G, υ 0 is the extensive form obtained by unravelling the game graph from the initial position υ 0 and expanding the game graph with the indistinguishability relations of all players on the unravelling [1] .
We consider a game tree T = (T , , (β i ) i<n , γ ) and the maximal bisimulation relationship over its expansion (T, (∼ i ) i≤n ) with the indistinguishability relations of all players. The tracking Tr(T) of T is a game graph G = ( , , (β i ) i<n , γ ) with positions that correspond to the equivalence classes of ,
and initial position that corresponds to the root of the T . The tracking of a game graph is the tracking of its unravelling, and each game is equivalent to its tracking [1] .
We must define knowledge set K i also as a partition induced by ≈ i in Ext (G, υ 0 ). Thus, the K i (π ) of a play π is a unique set K ∈ K i with π ∈ K that reflects the knowledge the player must acquire to play a safety game on G, υ 0 . Then, by expanding the knowledge set from the extensive form to the tracking of the game by setting as K i (υ) the set K(π ) for any play ending at υ so that a player observes its current position to be sufficient. For all initial plays π, τ ending at the same node in Tr (G, υ 0 ) , we have
For every extensive game, if the grand coalition has a winning strategy, then it has a winning strategy such that
If the tracking of a game is finite, then there is according to [1] a finite-state automaton over A i × B i for every player i that recognizes the knowledge set K(π) of any initial play
If we add a choice function to the finite-state automaton s i (K) at every state K ∈ K i , then we have a distributed winning strategy.
As soon as we have computed the finite-state automaton of the initial game of imperfect information G, we will compute the Kripke structures of the Knowledge Sets that have been computed in phase one. Kripke structures hold all the information obtained by the players to play a safety game each time, i.e., to reach a winning condition.
An epistemic model of a game G is a Kripke structure K = (K, (P υ ) υ∈ ,(∼ i ) ι<ν ) where (P υ ) υ∈ is a partition of K and each ∼ i is an equivalence relationship on K such that for all
and
, the models K ≈ 1 K are homomorphically equivalent. and the composition of homomorphisms is homomorphism.
The core of an epistemic model K is a : K ≈ 1 K with the minimal number of elements, and the core is unique up to homomorphism. To present the full knowledge that the players have at a certain stage of a play, we unfold the game G and at the same time retain the information in the Kripke structures of an epistemic model.
If (α k 1 ) k 1 ∈K be a tuple of actions a k 1 ∈ A compatible with the players' knowledge, i.e., for every i < n and for all
By updating
The initial element is the trivial structure {υ 0 , 
• where V t is the set of all epistemic models K over G with
The winning condition for Tr (G) requires that all paths through the sequence of Kripke structures be winning in the original game. In Figure 1 , an example of epistemic unfolding is shown. The grand coalition has a winning strategy in the original game G, υ 0 if and only if the grand coalition has a winning strategy in Tr (G) , K 0 [1] . If the image of homomorphism in this tracking is the core, i.e., the minimum number of elements, and we replace the repeated structures by their core, we obtain Tr core(G) , which is a game with perfect information.
Starting from the game G with observable winning conditions, i.e., when a player reaches the winning condition, all the others will be informed, we get the game Tr core(G) , and we solve the perfect information game Tr _core(G) instead (an example of Tr _core is shown in Figure 2) . The knowledge-sets K i are the full descriptions of the knowledge that players have at a certain stage of the play while the observations β i (υ) of the player are not.
We define the Kripke structure based on the Knowledge Sets computed in phase one as follows:
where (P K i ) K i ∈K is a partition K, and each ∼ i is an equivalence relationship on K such that for all
We perform the epistemic unfolding and compute the Tr (G K ). The Kripke structures of the knowledge sets of the players hold the knowledge of the current state of the game, and Tr (G K ) is thus a game of perfect information, i.e.: The winning condition for Tr (G K ) requires that all paths through the sequence of the Kripke structures be winning in the original game G K that holds as the finite-state automaton assures a winning condition.
If the wining conditions are observable in the initial game G, i.e., it is a safety game with two colors observable to all players γ : −→ {safe, notsafe} such that W = {safe ω , then it holds that γ : K −→ {safe, notsafe} such that W = {safe ω }. Since epistemic models are connected ∼ ∪, and the coloring is constant for a position K ∈ Tr G K , we have γ (K) and
Let us consider a winning strategy of the grand coalition in G K , s = s 0 s 1 . . . s n−1 and a play π t
for every k 1 ∈ K and ρ = k 1 0 k 1 1 . . . any path through structures in π t such that π t follows strategy σ t = σ 0 σ 1 . . . σ n−1 and 
. . K r is consistent with σ t . Then, any finite prefix K 0 K 1 . . . K l is also a path through π t of the form k 1 0 k 1 1 . . . k 1 l and extends to the whole π . As π t is consistent with σ t , which is a winning strategy, π t ∈ W t and consequently π ∈ W .
The grand coalition has also a winning strategy in
. . ∈ W and π core is winning and s core a winning strategy for the grand coalition. The reverse also holds.
As a consequence, during the second phase, we compute Tr _core(G K ), and as it is finite because of the finite-state automaton, we solve this game of perfect information instead; we solve a two-player game, i.e., the grand coalition of players against nature. The core element holds perfect knowledge of the game, so it is a stage of certainty that the equivalent of the G K game passes through.
A distributed game of imperfect information is transformed to a perfect game, and players become synchronized. Each player i based on his observations can decide about his current knowledge set K i for playing a safety game, i.e., K i is sufficient knowledge of the state of the game of player i based on his history.
Then, the best strategies are defined by solving the twoplayer zero-sum game (the grand coalition acts as one player and the second player is nature). The deterministic finite automaton reassures finite tracking of Tr _core(G K ) and the winning condition in the epistemic model.
The important task is to identify isomorphic Kripke structures in the game Tr _core(G K ). As soon as the isomorphic Kripke structures are identified, the game Tr _core is a finite game with perfect information. Likewise, games on graphs with the property that every cycle passes through a perfect-information state have recurring certainty, i.e., the uncertainty of players regarding the current state is temporary and vanishes after a finite number of rounds, i.e., the period of uncertainty equals the distance in Tr _core(G K ) of core recurrence [2] .
D. PUE DETECTION GAME WITH NO COLLISIONS BETWEEN PU AND PUE
This paper considers the PU Emulator Detection as a distributed game of n players -the SUs -with imperfect information about the state of the game and the actions of the other players for each channel. The SUs can connect to the Internet and a Cloud-based database. Many PUs/PUEs could be in a channel. The SUs define the same strategy based on the wellknown network constraints that are stored in the Cloud and upon hearing a transmission, the system covers both cases of static and mobile users, act {PU_Detection|PUE_Detection} and come to the corresponding state {PU_DET, PUE_DET}.
The PUE is supposed to transmit with probability q=1-PUtransmission_probability. The SUs differentiate the PU or PUE transmissions from the SU signals. The channel upon PU or PUE arrival comes to states PU_TRANSMIT, PUE_TRANSMIT (not PU_TRANSMIT), and the SU will choose either to free the channel if his observations are of PU_DET or stay (PUE_DET). When an SU chooses to stay and PU transmits and then causes collision to PU and the state of the channel is COLSU_PU, the SU can vacate the channel within a predefined interval for the network as soon as he realizes the PU presence. When the SU chooses to stay and PUE transmits, the channel comes to state COLSU_PUE, and the PUE leaves the channel as his intention is to gain spectrum. When a PUE is challenged, the SU knows that it wins. If the PUE transmits and PU arrives, then the channel comes to state COLPU_PUE, and the SU knows then that it was the PUE transmitting and the newcomer is the PU who stays in the channel. On PU arrival, PUE eventually leaves the channel; PUE will have a serious penalty. If the PUE is detected, he leaves the channel but another PUE may arrive.
Following the section C analysis, the game tree is constructed as it appeared in Fig. 3 . The state I corresponds to the Idle Channel and when a transmission begins, the SU plays his strategy. As shown in Fig. 3 , the game tree has two levels for each round of the game. Each round corresponds to a high energy transmission. In the game graph, under the indistinguishability, the equivalent games form the knowledge sets (Fig. 4) . The initial knowledge set is K0, and the terminating knowledge set is KW. The deterministic finite automaton is constructed by the knowledge sets Ki, which become the states of the game and the action/observations of the SU as the transitions shown in Fig. 4 . We must decide upon the best strategies. The deterministic finite automaton assures winning conditions. The initial state of automaton is K 0 and the final state is Kw, the winning state. The K 1 state corresponds to the case where the PUE is not detected and takes advantage of the spectrum. The SU is aware of the existence of the PUE but still vacates the spectrum. The K2 state of the automaton corresponds to the PU detection certainty and K3 to PUE detection certainty. The K4 knowledge set corresponds to total awareness as the PU and PUE are identified. (As the state transition proceeds in the deterministic finite automaton, the knowledge of the game evolves).
In the Kripke structures of Ki as described in section C, the isomorphic Kripke structures are extracted. The tracking is finite. As soon as the isomorphic Kripke structures are extracted, the game is a perfect game, and the uncertainty of players regarding the current state is temporary and vanishes after a finite number of rounds. The transitions in the tree of Kripke structures is restricted by the DFA that assures winning conditions. The uncertainty of the players is focused on the cases when they observe that PU is present, and their actions are PU Detection. Then, the two-player (the grand coalition-one SU against nature, i.e., PUE) zero sum game is solved for defining the best strategies. A zero-sum game is the one where the sum of the payoffs of the players equals zero.
The grand coalition acts as a super-player and the zerosum game is based on the states K 1, K 2, K 3}. Whenever the SU finds an opportunity for transmission, then he gains the spectrum G1. There is a penalty C for SU interference to the PU and a penalty Pn for PUE emulation. The interference penalty implies that the SU will be discouraged with regard to transmissions. The attack gain of the PUE (causes SU-confusion) is C.
According to the graphical solution, we must define p such that the SU maximize his guaranteed average winnings, and the 2 × N zero-sum game thus involves solving a 2 × 2 zerosum game. If there is an element a ij at the game matrix 2 × 2 of the zero-sum game now Aij such that the SU player can win at least a ij by choosing row i and the player PUE can keep her loss at most a ij by playing column j, it is a saddle point. If in the matrix A, a 11 > a 12 , a 12 < a 22 , a 22 > a 21 and a 21 < a 11 , there is no saddle point, then we solve by finding equalizing strategies. If the SU chooses the first row with probability p (i.e., uses the mixed strategy (p, 1−p)), we equate his average return when PUE uses columns 1 and 2, i.e.,
We solve the equation for p. If the PUE chooses the first column with probability q (i.e., uses the mixed strategy (q, 1 − q)), we equate her average return when SU uses rows 1 and 2,
We solve the equation for q.(I ) = (II ) = v is the value of the game when playing optimal strategies.
There is no saddle point in the PUEA zero-sum-game, and there is an optimal strategy (p, 1−p) for the SU and (q, 1−q) for the PUE, and the value of the game will be v by finding equalizing strategies. If the SU wants to maximize his average winnings, he has to play PUE_Detection with probability p and PU_Detection with probability 1 − p. If the PUE wants to minimize his average loses, he must attack with probability q and not attack with probability (1 − q).
The 2 × 3 zero sum game is solved by the 2x2 zero-sum game of columns K1K2 (Table 1) . We can say that the critical state is K1 as this state represents uncertainty, and the SU can either be aggressive and play PUE_detection and earn Pn + G or play PU_detection and remain in the uncertainty with payoff C − G. Applying equalizing strategies, we get p and q:
As the zero-sum game is a repeated game, we must consider probability δ, i.e., the probability that the game will continue and 1 − δ, the probability that the game will end in the next stage. If the SU starts the game from uncertainty and plays PUE_detection, the game will come to a state of certainty and then will start again in an uncertainty state, etc. Thus, the overall payoff v1 if the SU plays aggressively, i.e., PUE_detection would be
If the SU starts playing from uncertainty and plays PU_detection continually, then it will remain in uncertainty and his payoff will be:
For the SU to have the incentives to continue playing, the constraints below must hold:
Similarly, if the SU is in uncertainty and decides to play PU_detection and from then on be aggressive, the payoff would be:
If the SU is in uncertainty and plays PUE_detection once and then changes his strategy and plays PU_detection, the payoff would be:
We expect SU to have incentives to change his initial strategy PU_detection and be more aggressive, i.e., play PUE_detection. If the SU plays PUE_detection at the beginning, the inequality must hold:
The total payoff of the game thus will be the sum of the four possible outcomes of the game. Some constraints can also be considered on the parameters of the game: C > G1 : (VIII ). This constraint makes the SU avoid interference with the PU, Pn > G1 : (IX). The network forces the PUE not to emulate the PU, Pn > C: (X). This constraint makes the PUE launch attacks but not be detected by the PU. C > G : (XI ), this constraint makes the PUE have incentives to launch attacks.
The parameters above that depend on the network conditions and govern the strategies of the game are stored at the Cloud database to which the SU nodes connect periodically to update their game parameters. At the Cloud, an optimization of the game payoff is performed as shown below:
The optimal solution, i.e., the values of network parameters, is delivered to the SU nodes. The SUs can differentiate the PU/PUE signals from other SU signals, but they do not know whether each one is a truly licensed use due to Primary User Emulation.
E. PUE DETECTION GAME WITH COLLISIONS BETWEEN PU AND PUE
We consider that PU and PUE may collide, e.g., if PUE transmits and PU arrives. In that case, the game tree is shown in Figure 5 , the deterministic automaton in Figure 6 , and the game payoffs in Table 2 . We solve the 2 × 5 zero-sum game of Table 2 graphically, and we get the 2×2 zero-sum game of the 2 nd and 3 rd columns that give the same solution by applying equalizing strategies as (III) and (IV) for p and q.
If the game starts from an uncertainty state and the strategy of the SU is to always play PU_detection, then his payoff will be:
If the game starts from uncertainty and the strategy of the SU is to always play PUE_detection, the payoff of the game will be:
If the game starts from an uncertainty state and the strategy of the SU is to play PU_detection once and then always play PUE_detection, then the payoff will be:
If the game starts from an uncertainty state and the strategy of the SU is to play PUE_detection once and then always play PU_detection, then the payoff will be
If we want SU to have incentives to play the game, the following inequalities must hold: payoff 6 > payoff 5 whcih holds (XV ) and payoff 7 > payoff 8
If (XVI) does not hold, then SU had better stop playing PU_Detection for the rest of the game. The parameters above that depend on the network conditions and govern the strategies of the game are stored at the Cloud database to which the SU nodes connect periodically to update their game parameters. At the Cloud, the optimal solution of the game is computed:
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The simulation was conducted in OMNET with the PU and PUE packets being of equal size, i.e., 50000 bits, for five SUs. The PU and PUE traffic follows exponential distributions. The parameters used for the simulation for the proposed protocol are Pn = 20, G = 1, C = 5, C = 2 and for equalizing strategies, the optimal strategy for PUE|PU is q|(1 − q) ∼ 0.33|0.67 and for the SUs, the optimal strategy solution is p|(1 − p) ∼ 0.22|0.78. The tests included the measurement of some metrics such as PU_Detection Positive, PUE_Detection_Positive, PUE_Detection_Negative. The probability PU_Detection_Positive equals the number of times that each SU played PU_Detection and he was right, divided by the total number of times the PU transmitted. The probability PUE_Detection_Positive equals the number of times each SU played PUE_Detection and he was right divided by the number of times PUE transmitted. The probability PUE_Detection_Negative equals the number of times each SU played PUE_Detection, and it was PU transmitting, divided by the total number of times the PUE transmitted. For the comparative study, the [18] was selected. In [18] , there is a Network Management entity that could receive the results of all SUs acting as one player against the PUE and therefore can be considered to be a cooperative model. In [18] , the PUE does not know PU traffic as in the proposed protocol. For the Nash Equilibrium computation of [18] , it was considered that a) the network, i.e., the SUs, can always utilize the spectrum released by the PUE detection, and b) the penalty to the PUE is high for emulation. Therefore, the strategies computed showed that when the PU transmission probability reaches 0.5 and more, the PUE stops performing attacks, and the network management entity stops defending the network. In the first experiment (Fig. 7) , the PUE plays optimal strategies 0.33|0.66, and the values of PUE|PU Detection versus the probability p of SU playing PUE_Detection are shown. The PU_Detection_Positive is 98% for p = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and then decreases by increasing the p while q = 0.33. There is more chance for misdetection and false alarm, i.e., that is why PUE_Detection_Negative increases. The PUE_Detection_Positive increases as there is more chance to detect the PUE when the SU becomes more aggressive and plays PUE_Detection more often. The PUE_Detection_Negative reaches 5%. In the second experiment (Fig. 9) , the SU plays optimal strategy 0.22|0.78, and the PU|PUE detection probabilities versus the probability q of PUE attacking are presented. Now, the PU_Detection_Positive reaches 99% and the PU_Detection_Positive decreases as q increases. The SU, by playing PUE_Detection with probability 0.22, misses more PUE transmissions as q increases. The PUE_Detection_Negative increases as q increases because the SU becomes more confused by the PUE attacks while remaining a relatively low challenging probability of 0.22. The SU plays a winning strategy with the support of the deterministic finite automaton so the PU_Detection_Positive and PUE_Detection_Positive are high, but the PUE_Detection_Negative reaches 5%. In [18] , the network management entity plays more aggressively at NE strategies so that the PUE detection probabilities (Fig. 9a and Fig. 9b ) are good but collide with the PU according to PU_Detection_Positive, which is a reason for penalty for the Cognitive Radio Network.
When the players choose optimal strategies, the results are like the results of the cooperative methods, which use message exchange for PUE attack detection. (a) PU detection positive for SU following optimal strategy in the proposed protocol and SU playing Nash Equilibrium in [18] . (b) PUE detection positive for SU following optimal strategy in the proposed protocol and SU playing Nash Equilibrium in [18] .
The real payoff for all SUs versus the PU transmission probability is shown in Fig. 8 and is almost stable, taking values between 2.11 and 2.31. The real PUE transmission probability is eliminated despite the continuous arrival of PUEs to the network versus the PU transmission probability, when the SUs follow optimal strategy as shown in Fig. 10 . This probability is much lower than the PUE_Detection_Positive because the latter is estimated on a per SU basis, i.e., another SU may detect the PUE and so free the network of the PUE attack. The minimum value corresponds to the PUE optimal strategy, i.e., q = 0.33 that is eliminated to 1%. Finally, the real PUE transmission probability versus the detection probability p, when the PUEs follow optimal strategy, is shown in Fig. 11 . Although the PUEs keep arriving one after another, the penalty Pn implies a backoff period for the PUEs, and the real PUE transmission probability is eliminated to the range [0.5%. . . 1.3%], i.e., similar to the results of [18] for real PUE transmission probability. FIGURE 10. Real PUE transmission probability for SU following optimal strategy in the proposed protocol and SU playing Nash Equilibrium in [18] . FIGURE 11. Real PUE transmission probability during the game for PUE-optimal strategy for the proposed protocol.
The system has a good response to the PU Emulation Attack as the coordinated SUs play a safety game from the beginning that assures winning condition and must decide upon the best strategy for optimal results.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper defined a new model of a game of imperfect information and applied it to the PUE Attack problem. As the game evolves, the SUs act as a grand coalition that achieves synchronization -all SUs make the same decisions without collaboration, i.e., without message exchange. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first that addresses coordination without collaboration in the PUEA detection problem with results familiar to collaborative methods. Eventually, all SUs act as a super-user who plays a zero-sum safety game with the PUE and defines the optimal strategy. The uncertainty of players regarding the current state is temporary and vanishes after a finite number of rounds. Upon successful PUE detection, the PUE identity is stored in the Cloud. The proposed system has high performance, and the results are similar to the performance of cooperative methods applied for PUE Attack Detection. In the future, research will be conducted on malicious nodes detection in the CRN.
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